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UNDERSTANDING THE JURY WITH THE
HELP OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Stephen Saltzburg*
INSIDE THE JURY. By Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod and Nancy Pennington. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1983. Pp. vii,
277. $20.
INTRODUCTION

American courts place tremendous responsibility in the hands of
juries. In civil cases, juries determine whether persons who claim
some kind of injury are entitled to receive compensation from other
persons. Juries who find that compensation is in order can fix the
amount of compensation at a level so low that it represents only nominal damages 1 or so high that the award plainly represents punishment
for behavior regarded as totally unacceptable.2
Juries in criminal cases decide whether a defendant is guilty or not
guilty, and if guilty, the degree of guilt. In some cases, juries decide
what sentence to impose upon a convicted defendant. The most dramatic illustration of this responsibility comes in capital cases, in which
a jury usually decides, or at least recommends a decision to the trial
judge, whether a defendant should live or die. 3
In the course of reaching these results, juries in both civil and
criminal cases are asked to do a number of different things. They must
decide who did what to whom, when, how and often why. Unlike
historians, who may well study a subject for years before arriving at a
conclusion about past events and who typically feel free to disagree
among themselves as to the accuracy of various reconstructions, jurors
have a limited amount of time in which to make a decision, have ac-

* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1967, Dickinson College; J.D. 1970, University of Pennsylvania. Professor Saltzburg is author of AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d
ed. 1984). - Ed.
1. See, e.g., Harris, Shockley Found Libeled, Receives $1 in Damages, Wash. Post, Sept. 15,
1984, at A2, col. 1 (Atlanta jury awards Nobel prize winner $1 damages in suit against newspaper and reporter for comparing his genetic theories to those of Nazi Germany in WW II).
2. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-17 (Colo. 1984) (discussing the
problem of "punitive overkill" resulting from multiple punitive damages awards in products liability cases).
3. Although the Supreme Court has not required that juries decide the life-or-death question,
and although it has upheld a judge-imposed death sentence following a jury recommendation of
leniency, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984), every jurisdiction in the United States
permitting capital punishment gives the jury the opportunity at least to make a recommendation
as to whether it should be imposed.
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cess to fewer facts than the historian, 4 hear evidence that supports the
parties' views of past events rather than an independent, detached
view, focus exclusively on the aspects of events to which the law attaches significance, and must endeavor to reach consensus amongst
themselves on a reconstruction of the events at issue.
To further complicate the task, jurors must attempt to understand
the law as it is given to them by a trial judge. The law found in statutes and decisions usually is written by lawyers for other lawyers. It is
not easily explained to the uninitiated. And yet, after simply hearing
the instructions delivered orally by the trial judge (and in some jurisdictions after having an opportunity to read the instructions), jurors
must master the law so that they can apply it to the historical reconstruction upon which they settle.
And while finding facts and learning and applying law, jurors are
also expected to do a little "rough justice" - to make the law work
fairly in a particular case. This may mean acquitting a technically
guilty defendant because it is unjust to apply the law as written to the
circumstances of a particular case. 5 In a civil case, the jury may reduce a damage award to reflect the uncertainty it may feel about liability, even though the plaintiff has proved liability by a preponderance
of the evidence, which is all that the law requires.
In sum, we expect a lot from our juries, and it is not surprising
therefore that from time to time we are inclined to wonder whether we
ask too much. Can a group of people, most if not all of whom have no
legal training, come together once in their lives, hear an explanation of
legal terms for the first time, consider opposing presentations by
trained advocates and arrive at a result that is approximately correct
and just? Doubts have been raised in complex cases. 6 But in other
cases our judicial system has assumed that juries can and will do all of
the tasks assigned to them, and that they will perform well.
For a considerable time, the assumption that juries truly did what
was asked of them was based on anecdotal reports from lawyers,
judges and persons who served on juries. But in 1966 Professors
Kalven and Zeisel produced a study of jury behavior that was systematic and informative, and that led many observers to believe that the
reigning assumption was supported by careful empirical observation.7
4. This is attributable to various exclusionary rules that protect the process from "prejudicial" influences, see, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time), or that serve to enforce constitutional or other legal
rights, such as the exclusionary rule that suppresses evidence in some cases if it has been seized in
violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Jurors are expected to do this on their own, since trial judges rarely tell juries that they
may acquit a guilty defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
6. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Lit., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
7. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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The jury, it appeared, had been tested and had passed the test.
Since the 1966 study, the focus has shifted from questioning
whether the jury can do what is asked of it to questioning whether
changes in the rules governing the way in which a jury is selected or
directed to perform its tasks improve, adversely affect, or have no signifi.cant impact upon jury decisionmaking. After the Supreme Court
held, in Williams v. Florida, 8 that six-member juries were constitutionally permissible in criminal cases, a spate of studies sought to test the
Court's reasoning. 9 Numerous studies, this time of "death-qualified"
juries, 10 also appeared in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 11 in which the Court found insufficient data to
justify a conclusion that juries from which persons opposed to capital
punishment were excluded were biased on the question of guilt or
innocence.
The most recent study prompted by such Supreme Court rulings is
Inside the Jury, a collaborative effort by three social scientists which
examines the effect that "decision rules" - rules governing the
number of jurors that must agree before a verdict may be returned have on jury behavior. The study appeared a little more than a decade
after the Supreme Court's decisions in Apodaca v. Oregon 12 and Johnson v. Louisiana, 13 which upheld state decision rules permitting juries
in criminal cases to return verdicts supported by a minimum of ten of
twelve jurors and nine of twelve jurors, respectively.
Inside the Jury is a very important book to anyone who is interested in the way juries work. It is carefully done. The authors demonstrate their concern for accuracy at each step of their analysis. They
recognize the dangers in moving too quickly from data obtained in
simulated trials to generalizations about the way real jurors perform.
To study a relatively small number of juries (sixty-nine in all), the
authors spent a great deal of time and invested substantial amounts of
research money. The investment was well worth it, for Inside the Jury
is the most valuable source of information about how juries go about
their decision-making tasks that has been produced. It will be cited in
any future litigation or legislative debate concerning the merits of
unanimous and nonunanimous juries. But Inside the Jury is much
more than a study of rules of decision and their effects upon juries. It
is rich in information relevant to a host of questions that lawyers,
8. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Beiser & Varrin, Six-member Juries in the Federal Courts, 58 JUDICATURE 425
(1975); Mills, Six-member and Twelve-member Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 671 (1973).
10. See, e.g., the studies cited and analyzed in Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D.
Ark. 1983) affd., No. 83-2113, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan. 30, 1985).
11. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
12. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
13. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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judges and legislators continually ask as they endeavor to improve the
quality of justice in America.
As good as Inside the Jury is, it is not perfect. In fact, the authors
may believe that in some instances they have demonstrated more than
they really have. There are some methodological problems that they
miss, and this review will examine the most important of these. But
nothing that will be said here is meant to depreciate the significance of
the research reported in Inside the Jury. That research and the data
that the authors have collected will enrich the discussion of juries and
the trial process for the foreseeable future. Anyone would be proud to
have made such a contribution.

I.

THE SIMULATED TRIAL METHQD

The authors of Inside the Jury began by deciding that a study of
mock jurors dealing with a simulated case afforded a greater opportunity for gathering data than a study of jurors sitting in real cases "because of laws prohibiting the direct scrutiny of actual juries and
because of the important advantages of scientific experimental methods" (for example, the capacity to tape a single trial and to show it to
all juries in order to control for the quality of the performance by
lawyers, witnesses and the trial judge) (p. 37). Thus, the research for
Inside the Jury was done by recruiting mock jurors from the actual
jury pools utilized in the superior courts of three counties in Massachusetts. At the beginning of each one-month sitting, a judge and one
of the researchers explained the study to the jury pool and passed out
a printed volunteer form to collect the names of potential mock jurors.
The volunteer rate ranged between seventy-five and eighty-five percent
(p. 45).
When the time for a mock trial came, the chief jury pool officer for
each court would summon a· panel of sixteen to twenty volunteers who
submitted to an informal voir dire by a researcher. The voir dire
sought to exclude from the mock juries law e_nforcement agents or
members of their immediate families and recent victims of violent
crime. Also excluded were prospective jurors who had heard about
the experimental procedure or the results of any of the experimental
work from other jurors, and those jurors who had been excused from
jury duty for the fqllowing day. Once twelve jurors and an alternate
were selected, the remaining jurors were excused and asked to return
to the general jury pool to participate. in the study at a later time (pp.
45-46).
The twelve jurors and the alternate watched a taped trial, which is
described in the next section of this review. The researcher told them
that the trial was a reenactment of a real case and that it included all
of the evidence, details, and testimony that were important in the real
case. The researcher also told them that after they watched the trial,
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they would be observed as they deliberated to a verdict. The experimenter selected a jury foreman, usually picking someone who had previously served in that role. Although the mock juries contained more
women 14 and more married jurors than the actual jury pool, 15 the
composition of the mock juries appears in most other respects to have
been very similar to the composition of the overall jury pool. 16
After the jury watched the videotaped trial, it received instructions
from the judge. 17 One-third of the juries were told that their verdict
had to be unanimous, another third were told that at least ten of the
jurors had to agree in order to return a verdict, and the final third
were told that agreement by at least eight of the jurors was required
for a verdict. 18 Thus, each jury saw the same trial and received identical instructions, except for the part concerning the agreement that was
required for the jury to return a verdict (pp. 50-51).
Before beginning deliberations, each juror filled out an individual
questionnaire indicating the verdict that he or she would choose if a
vote were then taken, how certain the choice was, and the verdict that
would be chosen as a second choice (p. 51). Thereafter, the experimenter took the juries to a deliberation room that contained ballot
pads and pencils for each juror, photographs of the exhibits and of the
street diagram used during the trial, and a small television camera that
recorded the deliberations. The experimenter reminded the jurors of
their decision rule and told them that they were provided ballots that
they could use for a secret ballot if they wished, but that they were not
obliged to vote in any particular way. Jurors also were told that they
would be given a lunch break and excused at the end of the day if their
deliberations had not concluded, but that they would have to return to
complete deliberations. The experimenter informed the jurors that
they could ask for further instructions and that portions of the judge's
charge could be replayed on a television monitor; that if their foreman
declared the jury deadlocked, a videotaped charge from the judge asking them to try once more to reach a verdict would be given; and that
14. The mock jury pool contained 44% women, while the actual jury pool contained only
34% women. P. 46.
15. Sixty-nine percent of the mock jurors were married, compared to 58% of the overall jury
pool. P. 46.
16. For example, the mock juries had 44% white-collar workers as compared to 46% for the
overall pool; 1% students as compared to 2%; 5% retired persons as compared to 6%; and 4%
unemployed persons as compared to 3%. The most significant difference in occupational categories was that the mock juries had 13% blue-collar workers while the overall jury pool had 23%.
P. 46.
17. Although the study does not make it absolutely clear that the instructions were also
taped, it is a fair assumption (and one would hope) that they were, since any differences in the
way the judge instructed each jury could have affected the outcome of the experiment. The
authors do indicate that the judge's "dynamite" charge to juries having difficulty reaching a
verdict was videotaped. P. 51.
18. Juries were assigned to decision rules randomly so that each experimenter had an equal
number of juries in each decision rule during the course of the study. P. 51.
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the jury would be declared a hung jury if it could not agree during its
second round of deliberations (p. 51).
Following deliberations, the jurors were given a postdeliberation
questionnaire, to be completed individually and without discussion.
This questionnaire probed the jurors' reactions to the videotaped trial,
how they reacted to other jurors, previous jury service and personal
background, ability to remember information from the trial and the
instructions, and jurors' opinions about nine key issues in the trial. At
the end of this postdeliberation procedure, the experimenter debriefed
the jurors and explained the purpose of the study (pp. 52-53).

II.

THE VIDEOTAPED TRIAL

Because all of the data gathered by the authors was based on the
mock jurors' reaction to one trial, the evidence comprising that trial is
extremely important. The data must be analyzed in light of what the
juries observed.
The researchers chose a murder trial that they regarded, with the
advice and counsel of legal experts, as a typical, serious felony case
that was sufficiently complex to afford a variety of verdict preferences.
They began with a complete transcript of an actual trial and reenacted
the trial using university faculty, professional actors, a police officer, a
sitting superior court judge, and two attorneys. They gave each actor
a summary of the case highlighting his or her testimony. The judge
and attorneys received unabridged copies of the instructions given in
the real case, selections of relevant testimony, and the actual opening
statements and closing arguments made in the case. The participants
in the reenactment endeavored to follow closely the original case while
acting in the way they usually would in a courtroom (p. 47).
The tape began with the clerk's reading of an indictment charging
the defendant, Frank Johnson, with the murder of Alan Caldwell on
the night of May 9, 1976. Next, the prosecutor made an opening statement. Defense counsel did not follow with an opening statement,
waiting instead until the beginning of the defense case to open to the
jury. 19 The prosecutor called four witnesses.
A police officer testified as follows: While patrolling his beat, he
heard a loud exchange of words between two men standing in front of
Gleason's Grill. He moved closer, saw the victim strike the defendant,
and saw the defendant draw a knife and stab downward in an overhead thrust into the victim's chest. The-officer disarmed the defendant,
requested help over a callbox telephone, and waited at the Grill until
another officer came and took the defendant away and an ambulance
removed the body of the victim (p. 47).
19. Whether this was a tactical decision or one required by a local rule or a particular judge's
preference is not revealed.
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On cross-examination, the officer stated that the defendant had behaved as a "quiet, law-abiding citizen" over the several years the officer had known him. Defense counsel's attempt to obtain the officer's
comment on the victim's reputation for violence was cut off by an objection from the prosecutor. The officer was pressed further about details of what he had observed (pp. 47-48).
The second witness, the police officer who took the defendant to
the station house, testified on direct examination that the defendant
had stated that the victim pulled a razor on him, but the judge struck
the testimony on the ground that it was illegally obtained. 20 On crossexamination, the witness stated that the defendant had not been in
trouble before during the years the witness had known him (p. 48).
A medical examiner was the third witness. He testified about the
cause of death and the condition of the body. Most importantly, he
stated that a closed straight razor was found in the left rear pants
pocket of the deceased, that the deceased had a blood alcohol level of
0.32% and, on cross-examination, that considerable force would have
been required to cause the deceased's wounds, although he could not
be sure whether the knife was thrust downward or upward into the
deceased's body (p. 48).
Finally, the owner-bartender at the Grill testified as follows: The
deceased and the defendant had quarreled at the Grill on the afternoon of the killing. The quarrel ended when the deceased threatened
the defendant with a straight razor. Later, the defendant and a friend
returned to the Grill. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and the deceased stepped outside together. The bartender could not see what
happened because a sign blocked his view (p. 48). The judge did not
permit the bartender to testify concerning the defendant's reputation
for peacefulness, the prosecutor having successfully objected to this
testimony (p. 48).
The prosecution rested on the foregoing testimony, and the defense
began with an opening statement urging that the killing had been an
act of self-defense. The defense called three witnesses.
First, the friend who had returned to the Grill with the defendant
testified that the defendant had attempted to avoid an encounter with
the deceased, that the deceased entered the bar after their arrival, and
that the deceased initiated the conversation that led to the fight
outside. Furthermore, the witness claimed that he saw the fight and
that the deceased struck the first blow and drew a straight razor. He
added that the defendant often carried his knife to use when fishing.
The witness' attempt to describe the deceased's reputation for violence
was cut off when the prosecution objected. On cross-examination, the
20. It violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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prosecutor established that it would have been difficult for the witness
to have seen so much through a narrow barroom door (pp. 48-49).
A barmaid from the Grill confirmed the bartender's account of the
events and testified that a car parked in the street outside the bar
would have obstructed the beat officer's (the first government witness')
view of the fight. She also was barred from describing the deceased's
violent reputation when the judge sustained the prosecution's objections to such testimony (p. 49).
The third witness was the defendant himself. He testified that he
and the deceased had quarreled on the afternoon of the killing and
that the deceased had pulled a straight razor on him. He said he left
the bar to avoid trouble and spent the time before he returned to the
Grill with his wife and children. He said that his friend came by, and
the two of them went to the Grill at approxima~ely nine p.m. The
deceased entered the bar and asked him to step outside for a conversation. The defendant claimed that the deceased became hostile,
threatened to kill him, punched him in the face, and drew a straight
razor as the defendant stumbled. The defendant added that he drew
his knife for protection and the deceased ran into it (p. 49).
The trial judge informed the jury that it could consider three degrees of homicide. He defined first degree murder as "a deliberately
premeditated killing with malice aforethought," second degree murder
as "a killing with malice but without premeditation," and manslaughter as "a killing without malice, as when a person, in the heat of passion or in sudden combat, inflicts a fatal wound upon another." The
judge also explained that self-defense is established when "there is a
reasonable expectation of suffering great bodily harm, all reasonable
means of avoiding or escaping from the confrontation once it is apparent have been exhausted, and the means of defense is reasonable given
the threat" (p. 50). 21

III.

THE DELIBERATIONS

The following table indicates both the predeliberation preferences
of the jurors and the postdeliberation verdicts (p. 60):
21. It is impossible to tell from the authors' account whether the judge, in describing selfdefense, placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant or whether the burden remained on
the prosecution.
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Pre- and postdeliberation verdicts and deliberation times.

Jury verdicts

Postdeliberation
First degree murder
Second degree murder
Manslaughter
Not guilty
Hung
Predeliberation preferences
First degree murder
Second degree murder
Manslaughter
Not guilty
Undecided
Holdout jurors at end of deliberation
in verdict-rendering juries
(averaged)
Deliberation time
(averaged in minutes)a

Decision rule
12/12 10/12
8/12
0
13
7
0
3

5
13
5
0
0

1
13
8
0
1

21%
24%
30%
12%
13%

28%
23%
29%
05%
15%

17%
26%
33%
11%
13%

1.61

2.89

0.00
138

103

75

F(2,63) = 6.56
< .003
MSc = 3096

p

There are several aspects of the table that are especially interesting.
In all three groups of jurors, the modal verdict is second degree murder. Thirteen of twenty-three juries in each group returned this verdict. No jury returned a not guilty verdict. The only obvious
difference between the unanimous and nonunanimous verdict juries is
that only nonunanimous juries returned verdicts of first degree murder. 22 It is also significant that only approximately one-quarter of the
jurors in each group began deliberations with a second degree murder
verdict as their first choice. Thus, there can be no doubt that group
deliberations produced results that differed from individual analyses.
While the table reproduced above affords a summary of the results
of deliberations, the authors of Inside the Jury offer more than this. In
fact, the heart of their research revolves around an observational coding scheme that measured the participation rates of jurors, their voting
patterns, the accuracy of their application of the law, the amount of
reliance upon the evidence presented, and the accuracy of statements
concerning the evidence. It is impossible, of course, for the reader to
do more than consider the authors' representations concerning their
efforts to assure consistent and fair measurement of juror behavior, but
these representations do suggest an overriding concern for accuracy
and fairness. Two coders, a male and a female college graduate each
in their early twenties, coded all of the jury tapes. In addition, one of
these coders coded samples of the deliberations twice, separated by an
22. Hereafter, the word "nonunanimous" and the term "majority-rule jury" will be used
interchangeably.
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interval of several months. These same samples were coded by other
coders who worked independently. It appears from all this that the
coding scheme produced consistency and enabled the researchers to
make fair comparisons among the various jurors and juries. 23
The conclusions drawn from the coding and study of actual juror
performance during deliberations reveal differences that might well be
regarded as more significant than the differences in overall results
among the various groups set forth in the table above. At one point,
the authors summarize some of the more salient findings as follows:
[B]ehavior in unanimous rule juries contrasts with typical behavior in
majority rule juries in six respects: deliberation time (majority rule juries
take less time to render verdicts), small faction participation (members
of small factions are less likely to speak under majority rules), faction
growth rates (large factions attract members more rapidly under majority rules), holdouts Gurors are more apt to be holdouts at the end of
deliberation under majority rules), time of voting (majority rule juries
tend to vote sooner), and deliberation style (majority rule juries are
slightly likelier to adopt a verdict-driven deliberation style in contrast to
the evidence-driven style).
. . . Verdict driven juries vote early and organize discussion in an
adversarial manner around verdict-favoring factions, as opposed to evidence-driven juries which defer voting and start with a relatively united
discussion of evidence, turning to verdict categories later in deliberation.
[Pp. 173-74.]

Having made these findings, the authors of Inside the Jury apparently
conclude that they have demonstrated the superiority of the unanimous jury over nonunanimous juries. 24 Other social scientists appear
to have accepted these conclusions. Indeed, two reviewers have been
so bold as to state that Inside the Jury establishes that the Supreme
Court was wrong in upholding nonunanimous juries in Oregon and
Louisiana. 25
The authors of Inside the Jury bolster the case for unanimous juries by noting that only nonunanimous juries returned verdicts of first
degree murder, a verdict that they find to be clearly excessive on the
facts of the case shown to the juries (p. 62). Although the random
allocation of jurors happened to produce a distribution that had a
much larger percentage of jurors whose predeliberation assessment
was first degree murder in the juries operating under a ten-person majority requirement than in the other two categories, the authors maintain that this does not explain why only nonunanimous juries returned
first degree murder convictions. Five juries in the unanimous decision
group had either four, five or six members " -,ose initial verdict prefer23. See pp. 53-58.
24. See pp. 227-33.
25. Loftus & Greene, Twelve Angry People: The Collective Mind of the Jury, 84
REV. 1425, 1429 (1984).

CoLUM.
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ence was first degree murder, but none of these juries returned a verdict of first degree murder. Ten juries in the majority of ten decision
rule group had this many jurors begin with first degree murder votes,
and four of these juries actually convicted the defendant of first degree
murder. Only one jury in the majority of eight groups had such a
large number of members with an initial preference for first degree
murder, and it did not convict on this charge (p. 61).

IV.

WHAT THE STUDY PROVES

Before reading Inside the Jury, I thought it might be useful to record the hypotheses that I expected to be proved correct by a study of
unanimous and nonunanimous juries. These hypotheses are not original, but find their support in other studies and descriptions of jury
behavior.
My hypotheses were these: (1) Unanimous juries are likely to deliberate longer than nonunanimous juries, since everyone on the unanimous jury must finally agree upon a verdict, while dissenters on
majority-rule juries never need be convinced of the correctness of the
majority view. (2) Unanimous jurors who finally commit themselves
to a group verdict are less likely to be critical of the final verdict than
nonunanimous jurors. Since people rarely like to confess their own
mistakes, unanimous jurors will tend to support their verdicts, while
dissenters on nonunanimous juries will disagree with the verdict, and
the fact that they disagree might cause some discomfiture for the majority jurors (although the majority in some cases might actually become more confident after hearing and rejecting the arguments of the
dissenters). (3) Unanimous juries are more likely to hang than
nonunanimous juries, since it is always harder to get twelve votes than
to get eight or ten. (4) Except perhaps in "majority of eight" juries,
which might begin with the necessary majority or a group close to the
majority number and thus have very brief deliberations, the factual
accuracy of majority-rule and unanimous juries should be similar.
Majority-rule juries would perhaps benefit from an adversarial development of facts during· deliberations, while unanimous juries might
benefit from the need to collect the facts necessary to satisfy everyone.
(5) Unanimous juries might actually compromise in order to reach a
consensus in circumstances in which majority-rule juries would not
compromise and would end instead with a majority group and a dissenting group.
For the most part these hypotheses proved to be correct. But I
would not have predicted that "majority of ten" juries would produce
less accurate verdicts than unanimous juries, as the study suggests. I
doubt that I would have predicted that jurors in nonunanimous juries
would consider their deliberations to have been less careful and less
serious than jurors on unanimous juries (p. 79).
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Certainly, there is cause for concern if majority-rule juries are less
careful, less serious and more likely to err than their unanimous counterparts. There is also cause for concern if it is true that majority-rule
juries are likely to hurry toward judgment once they approach the
number needed for a verdict while unanimous juries are likely to exercise far more care throughout deliberations, and, as the study suggests,
even change verdicts with some frequency in the final stages of deliberations (p. 102). Thus, the issue is whether the study demonstrates
these occurrences in a convincing enough fashion to warrant concern.
Others may be quicker to embrace the conclusions which the authors suggest than I, and they may be _correct to do so. But I believe
that what the authors identify as the most serious problems with
nonunanimous juries remain speculative and unproved. The study is
superb in forcing the potential problems to the surface, and it need not
provide final answers to take its place among the best social science
works on the legal system. In my view it earns its place, but it does not
provide final answers to the questions that it raises concerning majority-rule juries.
One reason for my doubts is that even a study so carefully done as
this one is bound to have methodological problems. There are, for
example, two principal problems with the authors' approach to testing
the degree and quality of participation by majority and minority jurors
in the deliberations of nonunanimous juries. First, it appears that the
jurors selected for the mock juries almost all had prior experience, and
the authors even selected foremen who had previously served in this
position. To the extent that jurors with prior service knew that unanimous verdicts are the American norm, they also knew that when they
were placed on a majority-rule jury they were asked to depart from the
norm. Is it any wonder that they would have less confidence in verdicts rendered according to a procedure that they knew was not the
one usually employed in the courts where they had served?
Second, the jurors were not told until debriefing why they were
asked to operate on a majority-rule basis. If, in fact, jurors understood
that unanimity was the norm and that they were in an experiment,
they might well have concluded that as soon as they had a majority
confident enough to return a verdict they should do so. In their eyes,
this might have been what the researchers expected of them.
We would have had a real test of whether minority jurors are likely
to have their views fairly considered by a majority had the jurors been
given an instruction like the following: 26
To return a verdict, at least (ten, eight) of you must agree with that
verdict. This does not mean that as soon as you have (ten, eight) votes
26. Another defect is that the study apparently assumes that in majority-rule jurisdictions
lawyers would not comment to the jury on the need for full participation and the importance of
allowing minority voices to be heard.
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you should stop deliberating. It is vital that all of you share your views
with one another and that those of you in the majority at any point carefully consider the views of those of you in the minority, and that those in
the minority at any point carefully consider the views of those in the
majority. If, after carefully considering all views and deliberating so that
everyone has been heard, you reach a point at which you believe that
further deliberations will not affect the verdict, you may return a verdict
supported by (ten, eight) votes.

It is possible that the dissenting Supreme Court justices in Johnson v.
Louisiana and Apodaca v. Oregon were correct in asserting that majority jurors will dominate discussion and that once a majority is reached,
minority views will be ignored. Inside the Jury cannot confirm or rebut
their assertion, however, since it did not test it, at least not in a way
that permits any firm conclusion to be drawn.
There are also major problems with the authors' suggestions that
the juries which returned first degree murder verdicts were plainly
wrong. It is apparent that the authors too readily accepted the claims
of experts whom they consulted that second degree murder was the
"correct" verdict. The real case from which the videotape was drawn
did produce a second degree murder conviction, and it appears that
the actors and researchers knew this. Thus, it is predictable that they
would have begun with a bias toward a second degree murder verdict.
It is also predictable that the performers on the videotape, especially
the prosecutor and the defense attorney, would have been affected by
their knowledge that second degree murder was assumed to be the
correct result.
Although a reader of the book does not see the tape, he must be
able to take the description of it as accurate, or he will be at a loss to
evaluate the study. The description of the witnesses' testimony establishes to my satisfaction that a reasonable jury could have arrived at
any verdict from first degree murder to not guilty. The reasoning a
jury would use to reach each verdict is described below.
First degree murder. The defendant knew that the deceased carried a razor, and he had quarreled with the deceased the very afternoon of the killing. Yet, the defendant armed himself with a knife and
returned to the Grill. He went outside with the deceased, apparently
without hesitation. He knew, of course, when he did so that he had
his knife with him. Although the deceased might have struck the defendant, a fight is precisely what the defendant expected, and he deliberately stabbed the deceased to death with great force. It really does
not matter what the patrolling officer saw, since there is no dispute
that the killing was executed with great force. Moreover, it is inconceivable that the deceased pulled his razor from his pocket, since it
was found unopened in his pocket by the medical examiner. The alcohol level of the deceased suggests that he probably had trouble even
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carrying himself very well, let alone in making a dangerous assault
upon the defendant. This is premeditated murder.
Second degree murder. The defendant might have known when he
returned to the Grill that there would be trouble, but he did enter
when the deceased was not present. Although the defendant armed
himself, he did so for protection. He went outside with the deceased
to avoid appearing to back down a second time. When the deceased
struck the defendant, the defendant killed him. He acted with malice,
but he had not planned to kill the deceased.
Manslaughter. Although the defendant had a knife with him, he
did not want any trouble. He went with his friend to the Grill and did
not begin any quarrel. Rather, he stepped outside with the deceased to
resolve matters that had arisen in the afternoon. When the deceased
struck the defendant in the face, as he plainly did, the defendant,
knowing that the deceased had previously pulled a razor on him, acted
in the heat of passion and in fear and killed the deceased.
Not guilty. The defendant had every right to go to his neighborhood bar where it seems he regularly spent time. He had not caused
any problem in the afternoon, yet he knew that the deceased had pulled a razor on him. Although the defendant did not want to appear to
abandon his bar out of fear, he also did not want to risk harm from the
deceased. He armed himself in order to defend himself if it became
necessary to do so. When the defendant went outside with the deceased, he hoped that the two of them could resolve the difficulty that
had arisen during the afternoon. When the deceased struck him, the
defendant reasonably feared for his life and might have thought that
any movement of the deceased's hands and arms involved the use of a
razor, since only that afternoon he had seen the razor. Although it
appears that the defendant was incorrect about the razor, he reasonably feared for his life and he acted reasonably, especially since it was
night and he could not see well.
The authors and their experts might well have considered second
degree murder to be the correct result because of the result of the real
trial and also because in real life that verdict is expected in many such
cases. But the methodological problem is that in real life second degree murder verdicts may commonly be returned precisely because juries must be unanimous, and therefore they tend to compromise. This
is not the same as saying that a verdict of second degree murder is a
correct verdict. Because of the influence of the knowledge of the real
trial's results - a result which because of long experience with unanimous juries was thought to be "correct" - the participants in the
mock trial might have sent subtle messages that increased the likelihood that a second degree murder verdict would be returned.
There is no way of knowing what is "correct" in either the real
trial or the mock trial. Reasonable people could reach different results
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and, in my judgment, could have returned any of the four available
verdicts. It may be that the "majority of ten" juries compromised less
often than the unanimous juries, but this is not a sign of inaccuracy or
undue harshness. It is what one might have expected from
nonunanimous juries. It is especially interesting to note that when jurors were asked postdeliberation questions about their confidence in
the verdicts, the level of confidence among "majority of ten" juries was
highest. Somewhat surprisingly, the confidence level was higher, not
only among those voting with the majority, but also among dissenting
jurors on "majority of ten" juries than the confidence level among the
jurors on unanimous juries (p. 77).27 The "majority often" jurors who
voted with the majority also expressed greater agreement with the verdict than the jurors on unanimous juries (p. 77). This suggests that the
dialogue between majority and dissenting jurors on majority rule juries
may produce a greater sense of confidence among the majority as to
the correctness of their result than a unanimous jury produces.
It should be apparent, then, that Inside the Jury cannot tell us
whether unanimous juries are more accurate than majority-rule juries
or whether unanimous juries compromise to an undesirable extent. It
cannot demonstrate whether the confidence of the majority on majority-rule juries in their verdicts is justified or is the product of insufficient attention to the minority's arguments. Nor can it tell us whether
majority-rule juries are prone to err as a result of reaching decisions
too quickly. Although it is not a source of ready answers, Inside the
Jury does serve to remind us that these are important things to think
about, to worry over, and to study. And while Inside the Jury does
not demonstrate whether the majority or the dissenters on the
Supreme Court were correct in upholding nonunanimous juries, it
does demonstrate that the justices asked the right questions. 28
27. Holdout jurors on unanimous juries obviously produced hungjuries, which made it diffi•
cult for the authors to say much about how the confidence levels for majority and holdout jurors
on hung juries ought to be assessed. See pp. 78-82.
28. My own view is that even if it were proved that majority-rule juries are as accurate as
unanimous juries and less likely to compromise, majority-rule juries offend the basic notion that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in order to convince the public that it should have
confidence in verdicts. When one, two, three or four jurors are willing to proclaim publicly that
the defendant is not guilty of the charge that a majority upholds, public confidence in the accuracy of verdicts diminishes. It is true that hung juries do not require entry of judgments of
acquittal, and this means that the government's failure to prove to each juror the first time
around that the defendant is guilty as charged is not an absolute bar to conviction. But I believe
that the public understands that group dynamics are such that hung juries may result more from
breakdowns in juror communication than from defects in evidence.
A hung jury means that a jury has been permitted to end deliberations without being compelled to return a verdict. No one can be certain that the jury might not have been unanimous if
it had taken all the time required to reach unanimity. At some point, fears of exhaustion justify
dismissing the jury. A nonunanimous verdict, on the other hand, is an announcement that some
jurors' reasonable doubts are to be disregarded once and for all. Whether this analysis supports a
constitutional rule barring majority-rule juries is more difficult to answer than whether it argues
for legislatures to retain unanimous juries as a matter of choice.
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LESSONS OF THE STUDY

There is much to learn from Inside the Jury, and I attempt here to
point out only a few of the lessons that might be learned. One lesson,
hardly new but confirmed by the study, is that jurors endeavor to follow the judge's instructions, but often have great difficulty in doing so.
Inside the Jury establishes that juries make a considerable number of
mistakes of law (pp. 80-81). There is a need for comprehensible jury
instructions if jurors are to do a better job in applying the law as it is
written to the facts of particular cases. 29
Another lesson, of particular importance to trial lawyers, is that
juries often use a story model to analyze a case. The stories that jurors
tell to make facts fit together is related to the verdicts jurors choose (p.
23). Juries that are evidence-driven tend to focus on arriving at a
group story, whereas verdict-driven juries tend to develop individual
juror stories and push toward votes on those theories early. Either
type of jury ought to be affected by the skill with which a lawyer can
pull together the disparate facts of a case and weave for the jury a
script that the jury members will adopt as their vehicle for assessing
the evidence or thinking about verdicts. Opening statements that put
forth attractive stories which fit the evidence to be presented and
which are followed by consistent closing arguments are of critical importance. One reason why the juries in the study may have been prone
to convict rather than to acquit might be the failure of defense counsel
to offer the defense story immediately. This is speculation, of course,
but it is something that trial advocates will want to think about.
A third lesson to be gleaned from Inside the Jury is that scientific
jury selection is unlikely to make much of a difference in the outcome
of the typical case. The researchers examined most of the jurors by
questionnaires focusing on age, gender, occupation, residence, education, political party, ideology, marital status, income, race, number of
previous cases heard as a juror, and number of criminal cases previously heard as a juror. The only significant differences among the
ways jurors voted that might be explained by background characteristics were that unemployed and retired jurors were somewhat more defense-oriented than working people, women tended to be more
defense-oriented than men, and jurors with more jury experience
tended to be more prosecution-oriented than beginning jurors (pp.
128-33). On the whole, however, the relationships between voting patterns and juror characteristics were weak.
A smaller number of jurors answered questions concerning years
of employment, spouse's occupation, spouse's years of employment,
years of residence at their current address, number of children, news29. As discussed below, a defendant deciding whether to go to trial or plea bargain might
well want to know that juries err on the law in a disturbing number of instances.
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paper most often read and frequency of newspaper reading, ethnic origin and degree of ethnic identity, and perceptions of the defendant and
the victim. Several of these factors did display some, if only modest,
predictive value: residence in a wealthy suburb, attitude toward punishing someone who causes another's death, and newspaper most frequently read (p. 129).
The authors conclude that it is difficult to predict who will be a
holdout juror, but less difficult to predict who will be persuasive and
who will participate actively in jury discussions. Those jurors who
participated more also tended to be more persuasive to other jurors.
Educated jurors tended to participate more frequently and to remember more than other jurors. High status occupation jurors, who also
frequently were highly educated, also performed actively and
remembered more than most jurors. Men spoke more than women,
but this might have been explained by the generally higher educational
and occupational levels found among the male jurors. The oldest and
youngest jurors tended to participate less than others. Prior jury service did not necessarily make jurors more likely to participate. Jury
foremen were likely to participate more than average jurors. It is a
little surprising, but open-mindedness was associated with speaking
more rather than less (pp. 135-47).
In sum, the results of comparing background characteristics to
voting patterns indicate that it is extraordinarily difficult to predict
how jurors will vote on the basis of characteristics that lawyers typically consider in deciding whom to strike and whom to pass during
jury selection. The authors conclude, however, that "the jurors' world
knowledge concerning events and individuals involved in the facts of
the case does affect their verdict decisions" (p. 149).
These findings confirm a view that I have expressed elsewhere, 30
which is that lawyers who focus on a single characteristic - for example, race or sex - in exercising peremptory challenges are probably
making a mistake. No single characteristic is likely to be a very accurate predictor in all cases. It also should make attacks on the consistent use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a single
group harder to win, 31 since the study indicates that the views of individuals do not differ appreciably as a result of their race, sex, ethnicity
or background characteristics (and therefore the requisite prejudice
may not be shown).
Inside the Jury gives us reason to be concerned about something
that is too often overlooked when juries are selected, namely, that
some jurors are likely to be especially persuasive in a group. Had I the
power to roll back the clock and to change one part of the study, I
30. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality
and Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1982).
31. See generally, s. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 889-96 (2d ed. 1984).
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would not have excused from the juries law enforcement officers, their
families, and recent victims of violent cime. Had these prospective
jurors been included, we could have learned whether they have
stronger feelings about aspects of the criminal justice system than
other jurors, whether they are more likely than other jurors to voice
their feelings, and whether they tend to be more or less persuasive
than other jurors.
I have been convinced for some time that one key to fair jury trials
is to assure that jurors who are biased for or against one side are excused. 32 This seems to lie at the core of the sixth amendment guarantee of "an impartial jury."33 The Supreme Court has told us that
jurors who come to a case knowing about one of the parties, even a
criminal defendant, can be trusted to put aside extrajudicial knowledge and to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in
court. 34 Just last term the Court overturned a court of appeals' decision holding that a murder defendant did not receive a fair jury trial
when the community feeling was so overwhelmingly against him that
prejudice seeped into the jury box. 35 This confidence in the ability of
"partial" jurors to act impartially is troubling. Jurors who confess to
being predisposed are permitted, if not coerced by the trial judge, to
state that they will be fair and thus to avoid challenges to cause. Now
that Inside the Jury establishes that a juror's world view and feelings
about the people involved in a case may be more significant than the
background experiences and characteristics that a juror brings into the
box with him, courts may be convinced that greater attention must be
paid to the problem of juror bias.
Inside the Jury should also make courts pause before assuming that
various errors in the impanelment of jurors are harmless. In another
decision rendered last term, Hobby v. United States, 36 the Supreme
Court asserted its faith in the proposition that any discrimination in
the selection of jury foremen and deputy foremen in the federal system, as opposed to some state systems, 37 was harmless because their
role was ministerial only. But according to Inside the Jury, foremen
tend to have special influence in deliberations. Hence the very title of
"foreman" may give· one juror unique power to influence others. In
the future, it would be interesting to see other studies examine whether
the foreman's influence varies depending on the way the person is selected for the job - e.g., by the trial judge, by the seat number in
32. Whether this is accomplished by expanding the scope of challenges for cause or by more
careful voir dire and use of peremptory challenges is less important than that it is accomplished in
some way.
33. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
34. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
35. Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984).
36. 104 s. Ct. 3093 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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which he or she is seated, by random selection, or by vote of the jurors
at the start of deliberations.
There are two other lessons to be learned from Inside the Jury,
although these have little to do with matters that the authors undertook to study. One has to do with the relationship of trials to plea
bargaining, and the other with the effect of errors of law on jury
verdicts.
As noted at the very beginning of this review, American courts ask
juries to do several tasks, most of which are difficult. Inside the Jury
demonstrates, without intending to do so, that a jury called upon to
assess the mental state and intent of a defendant often must be at sea
during deliberations. I have explained why any of the four available
verdicts would have been appropriate in the taped trial shown to the
jurors. Although most of the juries returned second degree murder
verdicts, there is no reason to believe that this verdict is more correct
than other verdicts. Nearly half the juries did not return this verdict.
This means that even with the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as a protection, no criminal defendant can be guaranteed a
"right" answer. Nor can a prosecutor having to bear this burden of
proof, especially when unanimity is required and compromise is possible, be assured the "right" verdict.
In a world of such uncertainty, is it necessarily bad for defendants
and prosecutors to make an effort to agree outside of the trial process
on the just result? If each side believes that uncertainty has been fairly
resolved, and if both have attempted to recognize the risks of presenting any reconstruction of facts to a jury, is the notion of compromise
worse than the risk of forcing a jury decision? These are not rhetorical
questions. Plea bargaining is disagreeable for many reasons. But Inside the Jury indicates that the difference among verdicts to be expected from juries is also cause for concern. No one would propose, I
suspect, that we deny jury trials to defendants who want them, but
Inside the Jury might support an argument that those defendants who
fear jury error more than prosecutorial overreaching in bargaining
ought to be permitted, even encouraged, to attempt to reach a fair
disposition with the prosecutor short of trial.
The final lesson is one of the most important from my perspective.
Years ago, I expressed concern about the tendency of courts to find
errors harmless in criminal cases, especially nonconstitutional errors. 38
The videotaped trial described in Inside the Jury appears to be a classic
case in which a trial judge erred, and in which the error might have
had more impact on the jury's deliberations than an appellate court
ever would concede.
The trial judge erred, I believe, in excluding evidence of the vie38. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973).
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tim's reputation for violence. In most jurisdictions, the victim's reputation for violence is admissible to support a claim of self-defense. 39
At the time the trial judge ruled in the videotape, Massachusetts
courts might well have limited reputation evidence to that known to
the defendant. 40 The trial judge excluded the evidence completely,
even though it appears that the defendant and the deceased were from
the same neighborhood, that reputations there were generally known,
and that the defendant knew the reputation of the deceased. 41 Had the
evidence been admitted, the jury would have been able to consider not
only the single altercation during the afternoon, but also the deceased's apparent violent personality. This would have provided
strong support for the defendant's claim that he acted reasonably in
defending himself. 4 2
It is not hard to imagine an appellate court dismissing any error as
harmless, however. The court might say that the jury heard about the
victim's violent behavior in the afternoon and that reputation evidence
was unnecessary to show the violent, or at least bellicose, nature of the
deceased. Inside the Jury demonstrates that jurors try to follow the
judge's instructions on character evidence (p. 155). Thus, a diligent
jury would have paid no attention to the defense's attempt to show
that the deceased's violent character made it likely that he initiated a
violent attack and that the deceased's reputation made the defendant's
response reasonable.
When the exclusion of this evidence is considered together with the
failure to give an instruction that a jury can consider a defendant's
character and that character evidence alone may create a reasonable
doubt, the verdicts of second degree murder become more understandable. Why was there no affirmative instruction on behalf of the defendant? Perhaps there was none in the real trial. Or perhaps defense
counsel on the tape neglected to ask for one. It is not unreasonable to
observe that a jury asked to believe self-defense might have been influenced by more proof regarding the deceased and an instruction on the
possible significance of the defendant's own reputation.

s.

39. See R. LEMPERT &
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE 238 & n.88
(2d ed. 1982). A typical rule is FED. R. Evm. 4-04(a)(l).

4-0. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 368 Mass. 518, 333 N.E.2d 400 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Tircinski, 189 Mass. 257, 75 N.E. 261 (1905).
41. The defendant did not testify that he knew the deceased's reputation, but it seems likely
that his lawyer by that time had given up the point after repeatedly failing to get the evidence
admitted.
42. A related ruling was the refusal to permit the owner-bartender to testify to the defendant's good reputation. While at some point the character evidence would have become cumulative and not very valuable, in this case the character evidence was the most important evidence
supporting the defendant's self-defense theory. Testimony by the owner-bartender might have
been especially significant on the theory that the jury might have been impressed that even in the
bar the defendant was known to be peaceable. Yet, this is the kind of ruling that is unlikely ever
to be disturbed on appeal.
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Again the problem of uncertainty raises its head. The Supreme
Court is wont to say that trials are often not perfect, and apparently no
effort need be made to make them as perfect as can be. 43 As a result,
the difference between verdicts in real cases based on similar facts,
although not between verdicts in this study, may well be traceable to
the difference in a ruling on an evidence point. Once again, one may
wonder whether the defendant who seeks to plead and achieve certainty is poorly treated vis-a-vis the defendant who chooses trial.
CONCLUSION

Inside the Jury is a wonderful addition to the literature on juries.
It probably is the most important study since Kalven and Zeise! did
The American Jury almost two decades ago. By using real jurors, the
authors have overcome the defects apparent in many less ambitious
efforts using college students as subjects. Through videotape and
scrupulous analysis of deliberations, Inside the Jury tells lawyers,
judges, lawmakers and social scientists interested in the behavior of
groups generally and juries particularly more than they ever knew
about jury behavior.
With all of its strengths, Inside the Jury is not a perfect study. Its·
flaws are real and should not be denied simply because the study is so
evidently significant and its effort so worthy of praise. Inside the Jury
will surely inform for years to come debates about trials, trial strategy,
and the role of judges in supervising juries. And if it is used properly,
it will pave the way for further work on juries. Surely its authors
would welcome this. If, however, more is claimed for Inside the Jury
than is warranted, the additional work that should be done might be
delayed. That would be too bad, because Inside the Jury has identified
the questions that most need to be answered.

43. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973).

